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In his opening contribution to this debate about the future of free movement 
in the European Union, Floris de Witte concludes that ‘free movement must 
be celebrated and defended as the core of EU citizenship, as a right that is 
available for all 500 million EU citizens, and as an idea that benefits all 
those citizens – whether they make use of it or not.’ [emphasis mine] One of 
the key reasons de Witte provides for his defence of free movement is that 
‘it makes us sensitive to practices of exclusion’. He argues that ‘the right to 
free movement and non-discrimination attached to EU citizenship can be 
understood to correct instances of injustice and promote the inclusion of 
outsiders: it makes national distributive systems sensitive to the need to 
incorporate EU migrants who contribute to the host state in an economic and 
social way.’
De Witte is right that free movement serves the important goal of pro-
moting the inclusion of EU migrants (the ‘outsiders’ in de Witte’s analysis) 
in the economies and societies of EU member states. This is clearly an 
important achievement of free movement. However, what about the inclu-
sion and exclusion of the much larger group of ‘outsiders’, namely, people 
from outside the European Union? If part of our evaluation of free move-
ment is based on its effects on the exclusion of outsiders –and I agree that 
this should be a fundamental concern – don’t we need to consider all outsid-
ers, not just those from within the EU?
My main critique of de Witte’s discussion is that it considers free move-
ment in complete isolation of EU countries’ immigration policies and exclu-
sionary practises toward non-EU nationals. This focus on free movement 
without consideration of wider immigration policies is striking, especially 
in the context of many EU member states’ highly restrictive policies towards 
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the large number of refugees and other migrants seeking protection in 
Europe over the past few years. As Sarah Fine points out in her contribution, 
‘how can we try to defend free movement as the core of EU citizenship 
without considering what is happening right now at (and indeed within) the 
EU’s own borders?’
I argue that we need to connect debates about the ‘free movement’ of EU 
citizens with discussions about EU member states’ ‘immigration policies’ 
toward people from outside Europe. This is exactly the opposite approach to 
the one traditionally taken and advocated by the European Commission and 
many other European policy-makers who have insisted on a clear distinction 
between ‘mobility’ of EU citizens on the one hand, and ‘immigration’ of 
third-country nationals on the other.
To develop my argument, I first outline some of the key differences 
between how ‘migrants’ and ‘mobile EU citizens’ are debated and regulated 
in the European Union. This is followed by a brief explanation of why I 
think the current distinctions may be considered problematic from both a 
moral and political perspective.
 Migrants
There are very large differences between how EU member states currently 
treat “migrants” from outside Europe and ‘mobile EU citizens’ from within 
Europe, in terms of both regulating their admission and rights after entry. In 
all countries, immigration is restricted through an often complex range of 
national admission policies that regulate the scale and selection of migrants. 
National immigration policies typically distinguish between high-skilled 
migrants (who face fewer restrictions on admission), lower-skilled migrants 
(relatively more restrictions) as well as different rules for admitting family 
migrants, students, asylum seekers and refugees.
National immigration policies also place considerable restrictions on the 
rights of migrants after admission, including their access to the labour mar-
ket, welfare state, family reunion, permanent residence and citizenship. As 
it is the case with admission policies, rights restrictions typically vary 
between high- and low-skilled migrant workers (with the rights of lower- 
skilled migrant workers significantly more restricted) and across family 
migrants, students, asylum seekers and refugees. As I have shown in my 
recent book1 that focuses on international labour migration; European and 
1 Ruhs, M. (2015), The Price of Rights Regulating International Labor 
Migration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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other high-income countries’ immigration policies are often characterised 
by trade-offs between ‘openness’ and some ‘migrant rights’, that is, labour 
immigration programmes that are more open to admitting migrant workers 
are also more restrictive with regard to specific rights (especially social 
rights).
Public debates and policy-making on immigration vary across countries 
but they are typically framed in highly consequentialist terms, i.e. based on 
the (perceived and/or real) costs and benefits of particular admission poli-
cies and restrictions of migrants’ rights for the host economy and society. 
This cost-benefit approach to policy-making has been a long-standing fea-
ture of labour immigration policies. Arguably, it is also becoming an impor-
tant factor, and in some European countries the most important consideration, 
when it comes to polices towards asylum seekers and refugees. Some 
European countries’ recent policies toward refugees and migrants fleeing 
conflicts and violence in Syria and other places are primarily shaped by the 
perceived impacts on the national interest of the host country rather than by 
humanitarian considerations, protection needs or respect for international 
refugee conventions.
A central feature of national migration policy debates in European and 
other high-income countries is the idea of ‘control’ i.e. the idea that immi-
gration and the rights of migrants can be controlled and regulated, at least to 
a considerable degree, based on the perceived costs and benefits for the 
existing residents of the host country. Of course, states’ control over immi-
gration is never complete and subject to a number of constraints but the idea 
of control is still at the heart of national immigration debates and policy- 
making. The perceived ‘loss of control’ over immigration has been a major 
driver of the rise of Donald Trump in the United States, Britain’s referendum 
vote to leave the European Union, and the growing support for right-wing 
parties across various European countries.
 Mobile citizens
The policy framework for regulating the movement of EU citizens across 
member states, and their rights when residing in a member state other than 
their own, is very different from the restrictions imposed on people from out-
side the EU (or the EEA, to be exact). The current rules for free movement 
give citizens of EU countries the right to move freely and take up employment 
in any other EU country and – as long as they are ‘workers’ – the right to full 
and equal access to the host country’s welfare state. This combination of unre-
stricted intra-EU mobility and equal access to national welfare states for EU 
workers is an important exception to the trade-off between immigration and 
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access to social rights that characterises the labour immigration policies of 
high-income countries. Critically, while the idea of ‘control’ is a central fea-
ture of debates and policies on the immigration of people from outside the 
EU, EU member states have effectively no direct control over the scale and 
characteristics of the inflows of EU workers. From the perspective of the EU, 
the overall aim has been to encourage rather than limit and control the mobil-
ity of EU citizens between different member states.
In terms of the European institutional framework, free movement is kept 
completely separate from the immigration of third-country nationals. While 
free movement is part of the remit of DG Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion and DG Justice, policies for regulating immigration from outside 
Europe are dealt with by the DG Migration and Home Affairs. One of the 
consequences of this division has been that EU debates and policy aimed at 
the integration of migrants have been heavily focused on migrants from 
outside the EU.
A third distinction relates to the terminology used to describe and discuss 
the cross-border movement of EU citizens and non-EU citizens. European 
policy-makers typically insist that EU citizens moving from one member 
state to another are not ‘migrants’ but ‘mobile EU citizens. (Although I am 
critical of this distinction, for the sake of clarity I have stuck with this termi-
nology in this contribution.) This distinction is not just a reflection of differ-
ences in policy approaches but also serves the purpose of framing public 
debates in a way that suggests that mobile EU citizens are very different 
from the (non-EU) outsiders whose migration needs to be carefully regu-
lated and controlled.
 Linking migration and mobility
The distinctions made in the public debates and policies on ‘immigration’ 
and ‘mobile EU citizens’ raise a number of important ethical and political 
questions. First, insisting on near-equality of rights for mobile EU citizens 
while at the same time tolerating what are sometimes severe restrictions of 
the rights of migrants from outside the EU is, in my view, morally problem-
atic. On the one hand, current policy insists on equality of rights for EU 
workers including, for example, equal access to non-contributory welfare 
benefits, i.e. benefits that are paid regardless of whether the beneficiary has 
made prior contributions or not. On the other hand, many EU member states 
are unwilling to admit and protect large numbers of refugees who are fleeing 
M. Ruhs
167
violence and conflict and/or grant them full access to the national welfare 
state. While a preference for protecting the interests and rights of insiders 
can of course be defended on moral grounds, I suggest that the magnitude of 
the discrepancy between how EU member states treat each other’s ‘citizens 
compared to most migrants from outside the EU should give us pause for 
critical reflection.
The disconnect between ‘mobile EU citizens’ and ‘migrants’ may also be 
politically problematic, in the sense that it potentially endangers (rather than 
protects, as is commonly argued) the future sustainability of the free move-
ment of EU workers within the European Union as well as public support for 
immigration more generally. The inflow of ‘mobile EU citizens’ in a particu-
lar member state has very similar types of effects, and raises very similar 
economic issues and tensions, as the immigration of migrants from outside 
the EU. As it is the case with ‘migrants’, ‘mobile EU citizens’ affect the 
labour markets and welfare states of host countries in one way or another, 
creating costs and benefits for different groups. Insisting that ‘mobile citi-
zens’ are not ‘migrants’ runs the danger of obscuring these impacts that 
mobile EU citizens have on the economies and societies of their host coun-
tries. This may, in turn, prevent important debates at European level about 
the consequences of free movement for EU citizens who do not move, and 
ultimately result in a decline in political support for the free movement of 
labour within the EU and perhaps also for immigration more generally.
A third question concerns the potential inter-relationships between EU 
member states’ policies on immigration and mobility. How are our policies 
for the inclusion/exclusion of EU citizens related to our policies for the inclu-
sion/exclusion of people from outside the EU? We know2 that past EU 
enlargements have in many member states led to more restrictive labour 
immigration policies for non EU-nationals, especially lower-skilled workers. 
This may be a perfectly justifiable response within the sphere of labour immi-
gration. The picture gets more complicated and problematic, however, if we 
consider the potential relationships between the free movement and equal 
treatment of EU workers and the highly regulated admission and restricted 
rights of asylum seekers and refugees from outside Europe. How, if at all, do 
the current policies for the inclusion of mobile EU citizens affect our policies 
2 Zelano, K. (ed.) (2012), Labour Migration: What’s in it for us? Experiences 
from Sweden, the UK and Poland. European Liberal Forum, available at 
http://fores.se/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/labour-pdf-web_1_.pdf.
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for excluding/excluding asylum seekers, refugees and other migrants from 
outside Europe – and vice versa? These are open and important issues for 
empirical research. Any defence of the current rules for free movement 
should, in my view, consider and engage with these wider questions and 
inter-relationships
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